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Abstract
The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to
resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not
veri…able and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows
that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision
maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Di-
rect involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information
enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of
higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is
granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has
limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to
an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some
organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the con-
text of judicial and antitrust decision-making.
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Judicial systems, quasi-judicial institutions, such as industrial tribunals, reg-
ulatory and antitrust authorities are some of the institutions through which
modern states administer the disputes that arise between their members. In
all such institutions the decision process consists of a …rst stage where the
information is acquired and a second one where a decision is made. E¢-
ciency results from the extent to which the information produced enables to
evaluate the available alternatives and by how the actual decision re‡ects
this information.
The paper studies the internal organization of these institutions in a
world where some information is not veri…able, decision makers may have
vested preferences and monetary incentive schemes are not su¢cient to dis-
cipline them. The focus of the analysis is the relationship between the design
of decision rules and the delegation of information provision. The former
relates to the degree of discretion that is granted to the decision maker; the
latter de…nes whether information provision is better assigned to the parties
directly interested in the decision or to an investigator (generally an agent
internal to the organization) with no immediate stake.
Although a rich literature exists on both these topics, each of them has
been treated in isolation. On the issue of information provision for decision-
making, several authors have analyzed the costs and bene…ts of relying on
agents with dissonant objectives. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) have noticed
that competition between two perfectly informed parties elicits all relevant
information, even when the parties conceal evidence that is damaging to
their interests. Shin (1998) has shown that with two biased parties the
principal can improve his ability to draw correct inferences by allocating
the burden of the proof to the better informed one. Other authors have ar-
gued that information-gathering is less expensive with two competing agents
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999) and that advocacy induces e¢cient mutual
monitoring (Palumbo, 2002). All these papers, however, assume that the
decision maker is a disinterested party. Thus, they do not deal with issues
related to the design of decision rules: the optimal rule simply consists in
delegating full discretion to the benevolent decision maker. Another strand
of the literature has focused on the delegation of decision-making to an
agent with superior information but vested preferences. This literature has
stressed the desirability of imposing limits on the decision maker’s discre-
tion in order to prevent opportunistic behaviors (see for example Holmstrom
1984, Brennan and Buchanan 1985 and Armstrong 1994); to address time in-
consistency problems (see, among many others, Kidland and Prescott 1977);
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or to reduce capture by interests groups in regulatory contexts (see for ex-
ample La¤ont and Tirole 1990, 1991).1 In all these contributions the process
by which the information is created is treated as exogenous. Our approach,
by looking at the relationship between the adjudicative and investigative
stages represents an attempt to bridge these two strands of literature.
We consider a setting where a decision maker - on behalf of a principal
- must resolve a dispute between two parties. Hard information on the
merit of each cause may be supplied either by the parties themselves or
by an investigator with no immediate stake. After a decision is made, the
interested parties can appeal to seek for correction.
The contracting problem faced by the principal is threefold. A contract
speci…es the amount of discretional power to grant to the decision maker
(decision rule), who is in charge of information provision (the interested
parties or the investigator), and the conditions under which the interested
parties are entitled to exercise their right to appeal.
The key feature of the model is that some information is not contractible.
Consequently, comprehensive and fully contingent decision rules cannot be
written. The principal can make up for this incompleteness in two ways. He
can set a rule that de…nes ex ante the decision to be made when contractible
evidence is not available or he can leave the decision maker full discretion
to use all the non-contractible information that is available ex post. We
shall refer to the …rst regime as Rules and to the second as Discretion.
Discretion is attractive because it allows the decision maker to select the
decision that is most desirable. The cost of discretion is related to the fact
that the decision maker cannot be fully trusted to implement the principal’s
goals. What may prevent the decision maker from abusing his authority
is the monitoring activity exercised by the interested parties through their
right to appeal.
We show that the direct involvement of the interested parties in the sup-
ply of information contributes to enhance their monitoring role. The reason
is twofold. First, the parties have an inherent incentive to retain information
that is damaging to their cause. Compared to the case where information
provision is assigned to a more impartial investigator, this raises their in-
centive to seek evidence of wrongdoing and increases the probability that
a decision maker who abused his authority is caught. Second, the parties
have known and opposing goals. Thus, they anticipate that concealment
by one side always works to the detriment of the other side, while cannot
1On the other hand, Cowen et al. (2000) have emphasized that discretion may enhance
credibility by enabling the discovery of the decision makers’ preferences over time.
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make the same type of inference when the investigator supplies the infor-
mation. This makes monitoring more e¤ective when the interested parties
supply the information also if the investigator conceals information and the
level of manipulation is the same under the two institutions. Thus, parties’
reciprocal monitoring constitutes an e¢cient mechanism through which non-
benevolent decision makers are kept on their toes.2
The highlighted positive correlation between the parties’ manipulation
of information and their monitoring incentives implies that the choice of the
decision rule (Rules versus Discretion) and the delegation of information
provision (to the interested parties or the investigator) are inherently linked.
Under Discretion, ex-post monitoring is especially valuable, for the principal
is more vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the decision maker. Thus, he
wishes to encourage ex-post monitoring by delegating information provision
to the interested parties (control from below). Under Rules, ex-post moni-
toring is less valuable, for the principal monitors the decision maker ex ante
(control from above). This increases the desirability to delegate information
provision to a more impartial investigator that ensures less manipulation of
information.
Finally, we compare di¤erent organizational arrangements and provide
conditions under which either is optimal.
Our approach sheds lights on a number of issues related to institution
design and helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are com-
monly observed in the context of court and antitrust decision making. The
Civil Law and the Common Law systems mainly di¤er for the degree to
which they insist on adherence to predetermined standards, with the Civil
Law system being more inclined to standards than the Common Law. Con-
sistent with our results, we observe that where a Civil Law system is adopted,
the proof-taking task is assigned to an impartial investigator who is supposed
to make the case for both causes. On the contrary, where a Common Law
2This result can be seen as complementary to the one in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
They consider a situation where a principal must choose whether to embrace one of two
causes or decide in favor of the status quo. Information provision is delegated to one or
two agents, who receive no private bene…ts from any of the decisions. With two agents,
e¤ort provision is ensured by making each of them an advocate of a speci…c cause. The
single agent is rewarded more when either of the two causes is embraced. In this setting,
they compare the incentives to monitor of the advocates and of the nonpartisan agent and
argue that advocacy enhances the integrity of decision making because it ensures checks
on abusive decisions in both directions. Instead, we consider the case where monitoring is
always exercised by the interested parties and compare their incentives to monitor when
they themselves provide the information and when the information is provided by a more
impartial investigator.
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system prevails, evidence is adduced bilaterally (prosecutor and defense at-
torney) through direct and cross-examination. The same type of matching
is observed in antitrust proceedings. The European competition law tends
to be regulatory and bureaucratic whereas in the US the statutes are in
most cases concise, and the law has been made through judicial interpre-
tation during centuries of litigation. In line with our analysis, in Europe
the investigation is mainly carried out by the Commission itself with less
intervention of the interested subjects. By contrast, in the US, the parties
involved have a great control of the proceeding and the fact-…nding.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tion 3 considers the benchmark where the game ends after the decision is
made. Section 4 allows for parties’ monitoring by introducing an additional
stage where the parties can appeal and ask for a revision of the proposed
decision. It discusses the case where the initial contract imposes restric-
tions on the decision maker’s authority (Rules) and that where the decision
maker is given discretional power (Discretion). Section 5 compares these
two di¤erent settings. Section 6 extends the model to consider the possi-
bility that the investigator conceals information with positive probability.
Section 7 discusses our main assumptions while Section 8 applies our results
to shed some lights on issues related to the organization of legal systems and
antitrust proceedings. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
Suppose a principal (Congress) delegates to a decision maker (antitrust au-
thority, judge) the task of deciding in a dispute between two parties, a and
b (merging …rms and their rivals, prosecutor and defendant). Throughout
we shall refer to them as Parties. The decision maker selects a decision d
from the set D = fA;B; 0g: Decisions A and B are to be interpreted as
favoring parties a and b, respectively. Depending on the context, 0 can be
interpreted as either the status quo, an intermediate decision or a more le-
nient sentence.
The principal’s preferences are single peaked and depend upon the realiza-
tion of a state of nature µ 2 £ = fA;Bg. Each state occurs with probability
1
2 . Let l
d
µ denote the loss su¤ered by the principal in state µ 2 £ when
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decision d 2 D is made; we assume
ldµ =
8<: 0 if d = µl if d = 0±l if d 6= µ; 0 (1)
and ± > 2. Thus, the principal wishes to implement d = µ: Any deviation
from this rule in‡icts him a positive loss increasing in the distance from
the preferred decision. Notice that ± > 2 implies that ex ante the principal
prefers d = 0 to a randomly chosen d = A;B:
The decision maker does not respond to monetary incentives, receives a con-
stant wage equal to his reservation wage of zero and can be of two types:
“congruent” or “incongruent”. A congruent decision maker is indi¤erent
to any decision and we assume that he acts in the principal’s interest; an
incongruent decision maker receives a private bene…t V when d 6= fµ; 0g.
Incongruence may be due to a di¤erent view of social welfare, to corrup-
tion or political or ideological positions. Decision maker’s type and bene…ts
are unobservable. The fraction of incongruent decision makers is common
knowledge and denoted by ®, with ® < 1.3
If the state of nature is observable and veri…able by a third party, delegation
of decision-making is costless. The principal can easily implement his pre-
ferred decision by o¤ering the decision maker a contract that requires him
to choose d = µ. The contract is then enforced by setting appropriate out-
of-equilibrium penalties if the decision maker deviates from the prescribed
rule. However, if the state of nature is not observable, a state contingent de-
cision rule becomes infeasible and inducing proper decision-making requires
the principal to elicit hard evidence about µ. We assume that the principal
can choose between two institutions. In the …rst, labelled Partisanship, the
task to provide hard evidence in support of either decision is assigned to the
parties a and b. In the second, labelled Investigatorship, the same task is
delegated to an investigator with no immediate stake. The two institutions
are mutually exclusive. Thus, either the Parties are in charge, in which case
the only hard information received by the decision maker is the one they
gather and report, or the investigator is in charge. In this case, the Parties
do not take any part in the provision of evidence. We are aware that in most
real world situations evidence is provided jointly by the interested parties
3This characterization of the preferences and bene…ts is one way to capture the potential
con‡ict of interests between the principal and the decision-maker. This speci…cation is
chosen so as to simplify the analysis, and has no impact on its insights.
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and other more independent agents. Our focus on pure systems has the
objective to provide a better understanding of the characteristics of each of
the two institutions.
Parties’ preferred outcomes are independent of the state of nature and com-
mon knowledge: party a always prefers decision A to 0 and 0 to B whereas
party b always prefers decision B to 0 and 0 to A. For each party i = a; b
and each decision d 2 D the utilities are private bene…ts; they are symmetric
and given as follows
Udi =
8<: U if i = d¸U if d = 00 if i 6= d (2)
with 1 > ¸ > 0.
As for the investigator, we assume that he does not respond to monetary
incentives and receives a constant wage equal to his reservation wage of zero.
For most of the paper we shall also assume that the investigator always
reports truthfully. Then, in Section 6, we extend the analysis to consider
other types of behavior while in Section 7 we discuss the possibility that the
investigator and the decision maker are the same person.
Information collection is modeled as the search for compelling (i.e. hard)
evidence in support of one of the decisions. Let h 2 fµ; Ág, with µ 2 £,
denote a signal; we assume that in state µ, h = µ with probability ¹ and
h = Á with probability 1 ¡ ¹. Thus, h = A (respectively B) represents
compelling evidence that the true state is A (respectively B); h = Á means
that the signal is uninformative. The signal h = µ is hard information, is
veri…able and can be described ex ante at no cost. However, it is privately
observed by the agent who acquires it. Thus, it can be substantiated if
transmitted but can be concealed. Let bh 2 fµ; Ág denote the report. An
agent who observes h = µ can either tell the truth (bh = µ) or claim that
the search for evidence was unfruitful, in which case bh = Á. By contrast an
agent who observes h = Á can only report bh = Á. We let the amount of
information collection be the same under both institutions. We formalize
this by assuming that under Investigatorship the investigator observes two
simultaneous and independent realizations of h. Instead, under Partisanship
the Parties observe one realization each. This assumption is meant to avoid
the bias that could be generated by the Parties being two.
Furthermore, to capture the value of discretion in a simple way, we as-
sume that under both institutions the mere unfolding of the dispute and
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the examination of its di¤erent aspects provides the decision maker with
information (a signal) beyond what is acquired through the report of h.
This occurs for example during the hearings in the phases of examination,
cross-examinations and information processing.4 This signal is soft and non-
veri…able, i.e. non-contractible; further, it is perfectly informative. That
parties a and b do not possess any soft information and that the decision
maker is fully informed involves little loss of generality, but highly simpli-
…es the derivation of our results. In Section 7 we shall discuss alternative
assumptions.
Consider now the the contract between the principal and the decision maker.
If bh = µ the principal can implement the optimal decision by requiring the
decision maker to abide by the following rule5
d = µ if bh = µ (3)
If bh = Á, there is no evidence of what constitutes the optimal decision and
we assume that the set of feasible contracts consists of two alternatives. The
principal can establish ex ante the decision to be made when bh = Á. In this
case, referred to as Rules, the optimal contract is (from (1) and ± > 2)
d = 0 if bh = Á (4)
Alternatively, the principal can empower the decision maker with the right
to decide in all situations where bh = Á. We shall refer to this contract
as Discretion. The value of discretion stems from the possibility to use
the soft information that becomes available ex post. Indeed, under the
simplifying assumption that the soft information acquired by the decision
maker perfectly reveals the true state, Discretion achieves the …rst-best
4Alternatively, the soft signal could be interpreted as the report of independent scien-
tists or expert witnesses. Indeed, as suggested by Shin (1988), “when a dispute hinges
on disputed scienti…c facts, the submissions rely on the current scienti…c understanding,
including the possible controversies and uncertainties in existence at the time. Even when
dealing with well-established methods and techniques, it would be rare that any single
piece of scienti…c work is faultless. Understanding whether this fault is signi…cant takes
training and experience”... “In such instances, there may be a case for relying on expert
witnesses directly appointed by the decision maker”.
5With some abuse of notation, the expression “if bh = µ” is here used to mean “if at
least one of the reports is bh = µ”: Thus, when the Parties are in charge it su¢ces thatbh = µ for either a or b. Similarly, when the investigator is in charge it su¢ces that bh = µ
for at least one realization of h. Similarly, in (4) the expression “if bh = Á” is used to mean
“if both reports are bh = Á”.
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when the decision maker is congruent. The cost of Discretion is related
to the possibility that the decision maker abuses his authority when his
preferences are in con‡ict with those of the principal.
It is worth mentioning at this point that we are aware that better con-
tracts than the one considered here may be possible. In this regard, our
analysis should not be viewed as aiming at developing a theory of optimal
mechanisms but rather at evaluating particular organizational arrangements
observed in practice that di¤er with respect to who collects information and
to the degree of freedom granted to the decision-maker.
3 No monitoring
As a …rst step, suppose that the game ends after the decision is made, that
is, there is no ex post monitoring over the decision maker. The exact timing
is as follows. At stage 0 (contractual stage) the principal designs a contract
that speci…es the decision rule (Rules versus Discretion) and the allocation
of the information provision (Partisanship or Investigatorship). At stage
1 (disclosure stage) information is acquired and disclosed to the decision
maker. At stage 2 (decision stage) the decision maker makes a decision
conditional on the information received and the chosen decision rule.
Since the investigator always reports truthfully, under Investigatorship,
the decision maker receives hard evidence that perfectly reveals the true state
(bh = µ) with probability 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¹)2 and nothing (bh = Á) with probability
(1¡¹)2. On the contrary, given our speci…cation of the preferences, the self-
interested Parties have incentive to disclose only evidence that is favorable
to their preferred cause. Their behavior for the case of µ = A is illustrated
in Table 1.
Probabilities Information Report
a b a b
¹2 A A A Á
¹(1 ¡ ¹) Á A Á Á
¹(1 ¡ ¹) A Á A Á
(1 ¡ ¹)2 Á Á Á Á
Table 1
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Not surprisingly, under Partisanship, Á is reported more often than under
Investigatorship (with probability 1 ¡ ¹ rather than (1 ¡ ¹)2). Since an
ine¢cient decision may only occur when bh = Á, it follows that delegating
information provision to the impartial investigator is optimal under both
decision rules. In the absence of ex-post monitoring, it is always desirable
to maximize the probability that the hard information is reported truthfully.
This rules out the delegation of information provision to the self-interested
parties. Moreover, in the set up of this section, Rules dominates Discretion
if ®± > 1. As one would expect, limiting the decision maker’s scope of action
is optimal if the expected loss of discretion (the probability of encountering
an incongruent decision maker times the loss associated with an erroneous
decision) is high.
4 Parties’ Monitoring
4.1 The appeal stage
From now on we allow the Parties to exert monitoring over the decision
maker. We introduce another stage to the game (stage 3, appeal stage)
and assume that after the decision is made, at a private cost H; the Parties
can …le an appeal. If either party incurs H, a new information acquisition
process takes place. We do not explicitly model the process by which hard
information is provided at the appeal stage under each institution but we
assume that there exists a positive correlation between the information that
was available in stage 1 and the information that can be found in stage 3.
Reasonably, the probability to …nd hard evidence in stage 3 is higher when
this evidence had already been discovered but it had been concealed. To
simplify, we let this correlation be perfect in the sense that all evidence that
is concealed in stage 1 is found and disclosed in the appeal stage but no new
information becomes available.
If the appeal is granted, a new decision process takes place. We assume
that the appeal decision maker is drawn from the same population as the
stage 2 decision maker and has the same information. The same decision rule
applies to both decisional stages. In case of a reversal, the stage 2 decision
maker su¤ers a loss R ¸ 0 where R is limited and exogenously given. R may
either stand for a loss of reputation or for a measure of the extent to which
the decision maker’s career is jeopardized by an incorrect decision. A new
decision process costs C < ±l to the principal. This cost contributes to the
total expected loss the principal aims to minimize, together with the loss of
erroneous decisions.
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With the introduction of the appeal stage, the contracting problem faced
by the principal becomes threefold. Not only does a contract specify the
amount of discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who is
in charge of information provision but it also regulates the circumstances
under which the Parties can ask for a new decision. Under the assumption
that all decision makers are drawn from the same population, the optimal
contract grants the appeal only when there is veri…able evidence that an
ine¢cient decision was made. Indeed, if there is no evidence of wrongdoing,
the expected outcome of the appeal game is the same as that of the …rst
period game and systematic appeals only add an extra cost C.6
In the set up we have considered appeals are valuable only to the extent
that they a¤ect the decision maker’s behavior at stage 2. In practice, appeals
serve many purposes: they act as monitoring devices, enable discovery of
new evidence and help correct errors in decision-making. We have restricted
attention to the monitoring role to better focus on the purposes of the paper.
4.2 Rules
Consider the case where the initial contract prevents the decision maker to
make use of his soft information by establishing a regime of Rules. As the
following Proposition shows, under Rules it is still optimal to rely on a more
impartial investigator to provide information.
Proposition 1 Under Rules delegating information acquisition to an im-
partial investigator is always preferred.
The intuition behind this result lies in the fact that under Rules the
principal protects himself against opportunistic behaviors from the decision
maker by restricting his scope of authority (control from above). To the ex-
tent that the decision maker’s hands are tied, ex-post monitoring has limited
value (nil in our simpli…ed setting) and the outcome of the decision-making
process is mainly determined by the e¢ciency of the information provision
process. Hence, relying on the impartial investigator is preferable. To see
this, …rst suppose that information provision is assigned to the investigator.
With probability 1¡(1¡¹)2 the report is bh = µ and d = µ; with probability
(1 ¡ ¹)2 the report is bh = Á and an ine¢cient decision (d = 0) occurs.7 In
both cases, there is no scope for appeal. The expected loss to the principal
6Note also that under this rule frivolous appeals never occur.
7Note that contract enforceability implies that deviations from (3) and (4) never occur.
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under Rules-Investigatorship is thus
LRI = (1 ¡ ¹)2l (5)
Now suppose that the Parties supply the information. Disclosing only in-
formation in support of the preferred decision is still the Parties’ optimal
strategy at stage 1 (see Table 1). Hence, under Rules-Partisanship, the ex-
pected loss if there is no appeal is (1 ¡ ¹)l. Clearly, this is larger than LRI .
Allowing for the appeal does not a¤ect the result. The best the appeal can
do is to permit each party to discover the manipulation of the opponent.
This yields a loss of (1 ¡ ¹)2l plus the expected cost of appeal, which is
greater than LRI :
4.3 Discretion
Let us now turn to the case where the initial contract grants discretion to the
decision maker (Discretion). Clearly, relying on the impartial investigator
is still optimal when the decision maker is congruent and therefore there is
no need for monitoring. However, as it will be argued, this is not necessarily
true when the decision maker has incongruent preferences and therefore
monitoring is valuable to the principal.
Suppose that the information is provided by the investigator. He reportsbh = Á with probability (1 ¡ ¹)2. When confronted with this report, an
incongruent decision maker chooses d 6= fµ; 0g: This is because he correctly
anticipates that in the case an appeal is …led, no evidence of wrongdoing
will be found. The Parties also anticipate this and therefore do not incur
H in the …rst place. It follows that the expected loss to the principal under
Discretion-Investigatorship is
LDI = (1 ¡ ¹)2®±l (6)
Now suppose that the provision of information is delegated to the Parties
and consider their incentives to incur H in order to seek evidence of ma-
nipulation from the other side and reverse the initial decision. Clearly, the
Parties may wish to appeal only when the opponent reports bh = Á: Since
the model is perfectly symmetric we can focus on one party only, say a: Let
y denote the probability that party a …les an appeal, i.e. searches for party
b’s manipulation, and x the probability that an incongruent decision maker
makes his preferred decision (d 6= µ; 0) when the report is bh = Á.8
8Given R ¸ 0 a congruent decision maker always prefers d = µ:
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Assume that at stage 1 (disclosure stage) the Parties only report infor-
mation that is favorable to their preferred cause, as illustrated in Table 1.
When d = B; party a’s expected utility is
Pr(h = A = bh = Á; d = B)U ¡ H = ¹®x
¹®x + (1 ¡ ¹)U ¡ H (7)
when she incurs H and zero otherwise.9 Similarly, an incongruent decision
maker enjoys an expected payo¤ of
¡y¹R + y(1 ¡ ¹)V + (1 ¡ y)V (8)
when he acts opportunistically (d 6= µ; 0) and zero otherwise.
No monitoring equilibrium. Let R0 = 1¡¹¹ V: When R < R0; the in-
congruent decision maker always acts opportunistically since the expected
bene…ts from selecting his preferred decision outweigh the expected costs of
being overturned (expression (8) is positive at y = 1). Similarly, when
H >
¹®
¹® + (1 ¡ ¹)U ´ H0 (9)
the cost H is too large to induce party a to …le the appeal even if the decision
maker abuses his power with probability one (expression (7) is negative
at x = 1). In both these cases, Discretion-Partisanship is never optimal:
relying on the Parties to supply the information provides no monitoring but
yields manipulation.
Monitoring equilibrium. When R > R0 and condition (9) does not hold,
the Parties would always …le the appeal if the decision maker always acted
opportunistically and therefore the decision maker would never do so. On
the other hand, the decision maker would always act opportunistically if the
Parties did never …le the appeal. Thus, the equilibrium is in mixed strategies
where the probability that the Parties …le the appeal is (from equation 7)
x¤ = (1 ¡ ¹)H
¹®[U ¡ H] (10)





9Clearly party a never incurs H if she has observed h = µ. Thus, Pr(h = A = bh = Á;
d = B) in expression (7) is to be interpreted as party a’ s posterior belief that party b
observed A given that she observed Á, b reported Á and d = B.
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Equations (10) and (11) provide the interesting insight that, under Discre-
tion, delegation of information provision to agents with biased preferences
enhances monitoring over the decision maker (control from below). Since
concealment of information by one side always works to the detriment of the
other side, each party has incentive to seek manipulations in the opponent’s
report. The decision maker anticipates this and since he cannot be sure
whether hard evidence of wrongdoing will be found, he cheats with a lower
probability than in the absence of ex-post monitoring. In other words, Par-
ties’ manipulation and reciprocal monitoring represents the channel through
which incongruent decision makers are kept on their toes for fear of being
caught.
The assumption that the investigator always reports truthfully makes
the delegation of information provision to the Parties a necessary condition
to obtain control over the decision maker. The insight is more general, how-
ever. The key point is that the bene…t to each party from incurring H is
positively correlated with the probability that information is concealed in
stage 1. Thus, coeteris paribus more manipulation generates more moni-
toring. But who manipulates also matters. As we shall argue in Section
6, even if manipulation occurs to the same extent under Partisanship and
Investigatorship, monitoring remains higher under Partisanship.10
Our analysis predicts that the delegation of information provision to the
Parties generates costs as well as bene…ts. On the one hand, it gives an in-
congruent decision maker more opportunities to abuse his discretional power,
since Á is reported more often. On the other hand, it may reduce his incen-
tives to do so. In what follows we compare these costs and bene…ts and give
condition for the optimality of relying on the Parties to supply information.
When H < H0 and R > R0, the expected loss under Discretion-Partisanship
is
LDP = (1 ¡ ¹)2®x¤±l + ¹(1 ¡ ¹)®x¤[±l ¡ y¤(±l ¡ C)] (12)
10Given the speci…cities of our model, it would be desirable for the Parties never to
disclose any information so as to exploit the positive relationship between manipulation
and monitoring. Indeed, suppose that party a plays the strategy: “I always report bh = Á,
then if I observe h = A and d 6= A, I appeal and report bh = A”. It is not di¢cult to
see that for R > R0, the incongruent decision maker’s best response to this strategy is
to choose d = µ. Appeals would then be o¤-the-equilibrium path and the Parties would
be better-o¤ for they could save H. This strategy, however, is quite unreasonable and
would be an artefact of our ruling out the possibility of errors in decision making (i.e. our
assuming that the decision maker is perfectly informed).
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The …rst term of the right-hand side of (12) is the loss when both parties ob-
serve h = Á (no manipulation) and therefore there is no appeal. Compared
to its counterpart in LDI ; it shows the bene…t of monitoring : the probability
of an ine¢cient decision is lower. Since the decision maker does not observe
the information in the hands of the Parties, he fears reversal also when such
reversal cannot take place because hard evidence of wrongdoing is not avail-
able. The second term is the loss when the report is bh = Á but either party a
or b concealed information. With probability y¤ the appeal is triggered and
the optimal decision is achieved. With probability 1 ¡ y¤ the appeal is not
triggered and therefore an ine¢cient decision occurs whenever the decision
maker is incongruent.11 This represents the cost of manipulation.
Substituting for (10) and (11) into (12) and comparing the resulting
expression with (6) yields as follows.
Proposition 2 Under Discretion, delegating information acquisition to the
Parties is optimal if R > R0 and H < ¹®1+¹®+ V (C¡±l)¹®(V+R)
U ´ H1; where H1 <
H0:
Relying on the Parties to provide information enhances monitoring but
comes at the cost of more manipulation. Thus, Discretion-Partisanship dom-
inates Discretion-Investigatorship if the bene…ts of monitoring more than
o¤set the costs of manipulation. Proposition 2 suggests that this holds
when monitoring is cheap (H low), valuable (±l high) and not too costly to
the principal (C low).
We have assumed all along that there are no penalties for the Parties
when they are caught manipulating. One may argue, though, that the prin-
cipal could reduce concealment of information by making it costly. The next
proposition shows that for H < H0 it is never optimal for the principal to
punish detected manipulation under Partisanship.
Proposition 3 When H < H0; penalties to the Parties for detected manip-
ulation are never optimal.
The intuition for Proposition 3 lies in the fact that the Parties’ prefer-
ences are known and that the decision maker su¤ers a positive loss when
caught misbehaving. To see this, let ¯ · 1 denote the probability that the
11Note that LDP is lower than C; where C would be the loss if the principal did not
delegate the appeal decision to the parties but speci…ed ex ante that appeal occurs with
probability 1.
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Parties conceal evidence unfavorable to their preferred cause. In the appeal
game the Parties receive a pay-o¤ of zero when they do not incur H; and
so does the decision maker when he does not act opportunistically. Thus,
in equilibrium any increase in ¯ has to be compensated by adjustments in
x¤ and y¤ that leave unchanged the Parties’ incentives to monitor and the
decision maker’s incentives to act opportunistically.
For the Parties’ incentives to remain the same, an increase in ¯ must
be accompanied by less cheating from the decision maker (lower x¤). In
particular, as a consequence of the Parties knowing their preferences, the
equilibrium requires ¯x¤ = constant. Indeed, when party a observes a report
Á by party b she assigns probability zero to the event “party b observed and
concealed B”. Thus, higher probability of manipulation by b results in a
proportional increase in the likelihood that a …nds evidence in support of
cause A when she incurs H.
Now consider the incentives for the incongruent decision maker to abuse
his power. He receives a positive pay-o¤ only if both Parties report Á and
the …nal decision is d 6= µ; 0. Two states can be distinguished: one where
manipulation of information took place, and another one where the Parties
genuinely observed h = Á. It is not hard to see that in equilibrium an
increase in ¯ leads to a reduction in y¤: less cheating (lower x¤) reduces
the decision maker’s expected pay-o¤ in the state where manipulation did
not occur (and therefore there is no monitoring), while it leaves it constant
in the state where manipulation took place (since ¯x¤ = constant). Thus,
less monitoring (lower y¤) by the Parties is necessary to leave the decision
maker’s incentives unchanged.
Finally, compare the bene…ts and losses for the principal and the decision
maker in the two states. For the decision maker, the loss when manipulation
occurs and he is caught is V + R. This is larger than the bene…t when
manipulation does not take place and therefore he cannot be caught V . For
the principal instead the bene…t when manipulation occurs and the decision
maker is caught ±l ¡ C is smaller than the loss when manipulation does not
takes place and therefore there is no monitoring ±. It follows that increases
in the probability of manipulation always move the equilibrium of the appeal
game in a direction that makes the principal better-o¤.
The basic idea behind Proposition 3 is that under Partisanship the bene-
…t of manipulation in terms of higher monitoring more than outweigh the in-
creased opportunities for the decision maker to abuse his discretional power.
Clearly, if H > H0 the same argument does not apply for the Parties provide
no monitoring. Thus manipulation yields no bene…t. Notice, however, that
in this case at the best, i.e. if the punishment completely deters manipula-
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tion, Partisanship can fare as well as Investigatorship.
5 Rules versus Discretion
We have shown that the choice of the decision rule and the delegation of
information provision are inherently linked. Under Discretion, the principal
wishes to encourage ex-post monitoring by delegating information provision
to the interested parties (control from below). Under Rules, the principal
monitors the decision maker ex ante (control from above). This increases
the desirability to delegate information provision to a more impartial inves-
tigator that ensures less manipulation of information.
We now compare the optimal organizational arrangements of decision
rules and information provision. We shall focus on the case where in the
absence of monitoring imposing restrictions on the scope of authority con-
ferred to the decision maker is more desirable than leaving him discretion
(LRI < LDI). This requires ®± > 1. In this case, the relevant comparison
is the one between Rules-Investigatorship and Discretion-Partisanship: The
di¤erence between a regime of Rules and one of Discretion can be cast in
terms of the costs that contract incompleteness imposes on the principal.
Under Rules this cost is measured by l. Under Discretion, it is determined
by several factors: the size of the control loss ±, the extent of Parties’ mon-
itoring, which in turn depends on their costs H and stakes U , and the cost
that monitoring imposes on the principal C. Thus, for a given level of moni-
toring and C, Discretion is to be preferred when l is su¢ciently large relative
to ±, that is, when the cost of “immobilism” or “moderatism” is high rel-
ative to that of “misguided activism”. On the contrary, Rules should be
preferred whenever the cost of “misguided activism” is large relative to the
loss of making a more intermediate decision. Clearly, all other things being
equal, the desirability of Discretion-Partisanship increases as the principal
bene…ts signi…cantly from the existence of an ex-post control mechanism
(lower C) or Parties’ monitoring becomes more e¤ective (higher U ¡ H).
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 4 Discretion-Partisanship dominates Rules-Investigator when
U and l are high or C, ± or H are low.
Proof. Notice that LDP < LRI if H < 2¹
±+2¹+V (C¡±l)l(V+R)
U ´ H2; with
H2 < H1:
17
6 Investigator does not report truthfully
We have seen that under Discretion delegation of information provision to
the Parties may be optimal because of the direct relationship between mon-
itoring and manipulation. This result was derived under the assumption
that the investigator always reports truthfully and therefore delegation of
information provision to the Parties is a necessary condition to induce mon-
itoring. In this section we allow for manipulation by the investigator. Our
main …nding is that under Partisanship monitoring is more e¢cient because
the Parties know their preferences but not those of the investigator. This
enables us to state the following results. First, Proposition 2 holds also when
the investigator conceals evidence provided that total manipulation is not
higher under Investigatorship. Second, under Investigatorship Proposition
3 does not hold: more manipulation is not always desirable.
Suppose that with probability ° the investigator does not report truth-
fully, i.e. reports bh = Á whenever h = µ. Manipulation occurs to the same
extent under Partisanship and Investigatorship if12
° =
1 ¡ ¹
2 ¡ ¹ ´ °
We prove the following result.
Proposition 5 If R > R0 and H < H1 then LDI (°) > LDP for any
° 2 [0; °]:
Suppose that ° = °: When d = B; party a’s expected pay-o¤ is
Pr(h = A = bh = Á; d = B)U ¡ H = ®x¹U ¡ H (13)
when she incurs H and zero otherwise. It is easy to show that expression
(13) is lower than (7): under Investigatorship the abuse of discretional power
is larger. The intuition is that the Parties know their preferences but not
those of the investigator. In particular, under Investigatorship, when party
a observes a report bh = Á, she cannot rule out that B was in fact observed,
whereas she can under Partisanship. Thus, more manipulation by the inves-
tigator raises the probability to …nd evidence both in favor and against cause
12Under Investigatorship manipulation occurs with probability °(1 ¡ (1¡ ¹)2) =
°¹ (2¡ ¹). Instead, under Partisanship manipulation occurs with probability ¹ (1¡ ¹) :
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A and this depresses the incentives to monitor compared to the Partisanship
case.13
Now, consider the incentives for an incongruent decision maker to act
opportunistically. He enjoys an expected payo¤ of
¡¹yR + (1 ¡ ¹)yV + (1 ¡ y)V (14)
when he chooses d 6= µ; 0 and zero otherwise. Notice that expression (14)
is equal to (8). This is because the decision maker knows the true µ and
therefore whether it is the investigator or the Parties that gather informa-
tion is irrelevant to him. Only he cares about the total extent of manip-
ulation. Thus, when the amount of manipulation is the same under both
institutions, the immediate consequence of monitoring being more e¢cient
under Partisanship is that Discretion-Partisanship dominates Discretion-
Investigatorship. A more rigorous proof of this result is provided in the
Appendix where we also show that it extends to any ° 2 [0; °]:
An interesting implication of Proposition 5 is that under Investigator-
ship Proposition 3 no longer holds. Since monitoring is less e¤ective under
Investigatorship, the bene…t of manipulation in terms of higher monitoring
and lower abuse of discretional power in each state may not be su¢cient to
compensate the increased opportunities for the decision maker to select his
preferred outcome.
Corollary 1 Under Investigatorship, more manipulation is not necessarily
desirable.
Remark 1 The basic message of the paper is that more manipulation gen-
erates more monitoring and thus it may be desirable under Discretion. The
policy implication we have derived is that the principal may prefer to delegate
information provision to the biased Parties rather than to a more impartial
investigator. We view the investigator as a member of the organization, a
civil servant or a bureaucrat with no direct interest in the decision. It thus
seemed realistic to assume that he distorts less “on average” than the self-
interested Parties. However, should total manipulation be (su¢ciently)14
higher under Investigatorship, the opposite conclusion would obtain. For
13More formally, under Investigatorship, for party a to be indi¤erent between incurring
H or not, an increase in ° must reduce x in such a way that the probability of …nding
hard evidence of wrongdoing °x(°) increases in °: dd° (°x(°)) > 0.
14More manipulation should compensate for the fact that monitoring is more e¢cient
under Partisanship.
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° >> °, the principal’s goal would be better achieved by relying on the
Parties under Rules and on the investigator under Discretion.
7 Robustness
Information structure
It should be apparent at this point that our insights are robust to the
assumption that the decision maker is able to draw better inference from the
unraveling of the various aspects of the dispute. Allowing the Parties to also
receive the soft information (i.e. to observe a soft signal as informative as
the one observed by the decision maker) would further improve their ability
to monitor the decision maker. Clearly, if the soft signals were perfectly
precise, for large enough R, the mere threat of an appeal would su¢ce to
discipline the decision maker and Discretion-Partisanship would yield the
…rst best.
Appeal
As already emphasized, Proposition 2 hinges on the positive relationship
between manipulation of information and monitoring and on monitoring
being more e¢cient when the Parties also provide the information. This
explains why allowing for the discovery of new evidence at the appeal stage
would not a¤ect our results.
Further, we have assumed that the appeal is decided by a single decision
maker who is drawn from the same population as the decision maker in stage
2. In this way, we have ignored that the appeal decision maker may serve as
monitor of the stage 2 decision maker. Causal observation, however, shows
that appeals are often decided by juries and the process is structured so as
to reduce the possibility of bad decision-making. In our set up this would
be equivalent to assuming that the appeal decision maker is less incongruent
than the one in stage 2. Let ! 2 [0; ®) denote the probability that the appeal
decision maker is incongruent and C(!) the cost of appeal for the principal,
where C! < 0. Notice that if systematic reviews (i.e. reviews exogenously
set by the principal) are not optimal, that is, if (® ¡ !)±l < C(!); hard
evidence of wrongdoing is still necessary for a new decision to be granted.
Then, it is still true that manipulation enhances Parties’ monitoring, by
increasing their ex-post beliefs of seeing the decision reversed. Similarly,
our results would be qualitatively unchanged if we let the appeal to also
serve as a device to correct errors in decision making (by assuming that the
decision maker does not learn the true µ ex post), provided that systematic
reviews are not optimal.
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One last consideration concerns the size of the punishment R. In our set-
ting reversals occur only when the decision maker intentionally pursued his
private interests at the expense of the principal. Hence, it would su¢ce to
set an in…nite punishment and an exogenous and in…nitesimally small prob-
ability of appeal to deter opportunistic behaviors. The out-of-equilibrium
punishment would not violate the decision maker’s participation constraint
and the …rst-best would be achieved. In practice, however, wrong decisions
occur for a number of other reasons: lack of information, incompetence, er-
rors, and so forth. In all these cases, imposing very harsh penalties would
paralyze the decision process and prevent decisions from being taken, which
is the main reason why we do not observe them in practice. Our assumption
that R is limited should then be interpreted as capturing this fact.
Separation of investigation and adjudication
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the decision maker in stage
2 and the investigator are two di¤erent persons. Proposition 2 is robust to
this assumption. Allowing a potentially incongruent decision maker to also
run the task of information disclosure increases the scope for opportunistic
behavior. When the decision maker has access to the true hard signal h
(rather than to the report made by the Parties or by the investigator), he
always selects his preferred outcome when h = Á since he knows that no
evidence of wrongdoing can be found. Thus, the bene…t of more manipula-
tion, i.e. the reduction in the abuse of decisional power when no compelling
evidence is available, is lost. This point is reminiscent of the literature
on the separation of regulators against collusive behavior (see La¤ont and
Martimort, 1999). La¤ont and Martimort argue that the opportunities for
collusion are reduced when the information about the …rm’s technology is
split between two regulators. Separation reduces regulators’ discretion and
the sum of their gains from collusion may be lower than with one regulator.
Our paper gives a di¤erent reason as to why it may be harmful to put too
much information in the same hands. It claims that concentration makes it
more di¢cult to monitor a decision maker who uses his discretional power
to pursue personal interests.
8 Applications
Comparative legal and judicial systems
The two most widely adopted legal systems are those of Civil Law and
Common Law. The former, which is a derivation of Ancient Roman Law,
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is typically observed in European continental countries, whereas the latter
is more widespread in the Anglo-Saxon world. Underlying the Civil Law
system is the great importance given to the “certainty of decision-making”,
which is guaranteed by a systematic organization of the law into a code
whose provisions the courts should administer without power of amendment.
The code is viewed as to supply a solution for any legal problem that may
arise and o¢cial discretion is seen as negative and harmful. On the contrary,
the Common Law puts more importance on achieving the decision most
appropriate to the speci…c circumstances of each case. Although certainty
of decision-making is recognized as an important value, …nding the best
solution for each particular case is considered the most important task.
The two most widespread judicial procedures are the adversarial and the
inquisitorial types. In the latter, the trial is conceived as an o¢cial inquest
conducted by a single investigator who is supposed to be impartial and to
look for evidence both against and in favor of the accused. Instead, in the
adversarial procedure the proceeding is dominated by the two parties - pros-
ecutor and defense attorney - and evidence is adduced bilaterally through
direct and cross-examination.
It is apparent that the di¤erence between Common Law and Civil Law is
partially one between a regime of Discretion and one of Rules; analogously
the institutions of Partisanship and Investigatorship resemble the way in
which the proof-taking process is managed under the adversarial and the
inquisitorial procedures. Interestingly, the same combination of legal and
judicial system is observed in nearly all the countries. In particular, Civil
Law systems are generally associated with inquisitorial procedures whereas
Common Law systems are often combined with adversarial procedures. Our
paper provides a theoretical justi…cation for this stylized fact.
The relative merits of the Common and Civil Law have long been dis-
cussed among legal experts (see for example Damaska 1975, 1986) and
economists. Most studies that take an economic approach have advocated
that judge-made and precedent-based law has an inherent tendency towards
e¢ciency (Posner 1972, Priest 1977 and Rubin 1977). The underlying ar-
gument is that disputes arising under ine¢cient legal rules are more likely
contested and litigated than disputes arising under e¢cient rules. As a
consequence, they are more frequently subject to improvements through
subsequent reversions. In this process the stock of e¢cient rules increases
over time. More recently, the superiority of the Common law has been sus-
tained on the ground that it promotes the development of capital markets
by providing better creditors and small shareholders’ protection (La Porta
et al. 1997, 1999). Finally, using data from law …rms in 109 countries,
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Djankov et al. (2002) have shown that Civil Law countries show systemati-
cally greater procedural formalism and that greater formalism is associated
with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less
consistency, less honesty less fairness in judicial decision and inferior access
to justice. Most of this literature has been produced in the US and compa-
rable research from a Continental European perspective is still very narrow.
However, dissenting views on the e¢ciency of the Common Law tradition
have been expressed by Van De Bergh (1988) and Tullock (1988).
Equally controversial is the debate on the relative bene…ts of the two ju-
dicial procedures. A number of authors have argued that the delegation of
proof-taking to the interested parties ensures a more accurate ascertainment
of the facts (Shin 1988, Posner, 1999). Others have defended the inquisito-
rial procedure on the ground that adversarial trials generate manipulation
and ine¢cient over-investment of resources (Tullock, 1975). Our paper con-
tributes to this debate by arguing that the costs and bene…ts of alternative
judicial procedures cannot be properly assessed independently of the legal
framework within which they operate.
Antitrust proceedings
The insights generated by our analysis appear to be relevant also in
the context of antitrust regulation. The problem of designing e¢cient pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of antitrust policies has been central among
politicians and economists in recent years. At the core of the debate lies the
inherent tension between ‡exibility and certainty in competition law. Cer-
tainty is necessary to maintain some degree of predictability of outcomes
and help the …rms to anticipate that a particular conduct or agreement does
or does not violate antitrust laws. Flexibility is important to re‡ect changes
in economic thinking and market conditions, two aspects that are particu-
larly relevant for competition laws. US enforcement of competition policy is
characterized by the leading role played by judges in shaping the law and the
extensive and explicit reliance on economic theory. The statutes are in most
cases concise, and the law has been made through judicial interpretation
during centuries of litigation. As stressed by Kovacic and Shapiro (1999, p.
18):
No other country has adopted an antitrust statute [Sherman An-
titrust Act, 1890], that contains equally broad substantive pro-
vision and relies so heavily on a common method of judicial in-
terpretation to implement them. The consciously evolutionary
quality of the US antitrust statutes, with their implicit recogni-
23
tion of the needs to adjust doctrine over time in light of expe-
rience and new learning, gives economists considerable power to
in‡uence competition law and policy.
Take as an illustration the case of restraints. Unlike Article 81 of the EC
Treaty15, Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not provide for the granting
of exemptions. Therefore, in principle, all restraints of trade are prohibited.
The absurdity of this solution has led to the development of the ancillary
restraints doctrine and, soon thereafter, the doctrine of the Rule of Reason
to narrow the general prohibition of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In so
doing, jurists have generally been keen on accepting the greater uncertainty
resulting from the inclusion of economics in antitrust law.
By contrast, enforcement in the EU is far more regulatory and bureau-
cratic and the adaptation of economically enhanced rules had been fended
o¤ as leading to an undesirable measure of uncertainty in legal interpre-
tation (Hawk 2000). Much regulation is based on a system of noti…cation
and approval by negative clearance, individual exemption, or block exemp-
tion. The factors the Commission must consider in order to decide whether
to grant an exemption are exhaustively listed in Article 81(3). A ‡exible
inquiry that varies in focus and detail depending on the nature of the agree-
ment and on market circumstances is outside the scope of the EU exemption
system.16 Further, the objective of achieving an integrated market has lead
the Commission to take an even more rigid position towards vertical re-
straints, which are essentially regulated on the basis of …xed per se rules.
Consistent with our results, in the EU antitrust is a special responsibility of
the Commission, to which most of the investigation is assigned.
“Much of the information used by the Commission in its com-
petition enforcement is disclosed to it voluntary by the parties,
reported by third parties, or gleaned from the specialist press
and publicly available reports and statistics. But the Commis-
sion could hardly perform its enforcement role e¤ectively if it
were restricted to information coming to it from these sources
and if it were unable to verify or supplement this information. It
has, therefore, been given active information-gathering powers.
15Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1957 [O¢cial Journal C 340,
10.11.1997]
16All agreements that do not …t into one of the block exemptions or that do not yield
the bene…ts described in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty violate Article 81(1), even if they
do not signi…cantly impair competition.
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Chief among such powers are the power to require that …rms
provide information in writing or produce documents (Article 11
of Regulation 1717), the power to obtain evidence directly from
…rms through on-the-spot investigations (Articles 13 and 14) and
the power to proceed to sector inquiries (Article 12). These pow-
ers can, if necessary, be backed by coercive measure in the form
of formal orders and possibly …nes. The Commission procedures
in on-the-spot investigations have met with considerable legal
challenge but have been largely vindicated and clari…ed by the
Court of Justice” (Ritter et al. 2000, p. 831).
The US procedures instead are much more litigation-oriented and very
demanding in terms of supporting economic and factual evidence. Contrary
to the investigative procedure in Europe, expert testimony is more often
required in the US where the adversarial process invites each party to expose
the weakness of the other party’s arguments and evidence (see Bellamy,
2000).
9 Concluding Remarks
We have focused on the organization design of public institutions devoted
to resolve disputes between two parties, when a possibly opportunistic de-
cision maker relies on hard information supplied by other players. Under
the assumption that some information is not veri…able, we have investigated
the contractual design problem faced by a principal who has to choose a
decision rule and allocate information provision.
The paper has yielded a number of general insights, which can be sum-
marized as follows. First, information manipulation enhances monitoring.
The larger the amount of manipulation at the information provision stage,
the higher the Parties’ incentives to challenge the decision made and to ask
for correction. Second, Parties’ monitoring is more e¢cient under Parti-
sanship than under Investigatorship because the Parties know their pref-
erences but not those of the investigator. Thus, involving the Parties in
the provision of information, ensures greater control from below. How the
principal weighs monitoring and manipulation depends on the extent of the
discretional power given to the decision maker. High discretion calls for
monitoring; thus information provision by the interested parties tends to
17Council Regulation No 17 (EEC): First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty (at present Articles 81 and 82) [O¢cial Journal No. 013, 21.02.1962]
25
be preferred. Low discretion renders monitoring less relevant and calls for
a more impartial information collector. Finally, as the loss of making an
incorrect decision increases relative to that of making an intermediate deci-
sion, discretion becomes more risky. Therefore, it should be preferred only
if the Parties’ stakes are su¢ciently high relative to their monitoring costs.
We have ruled out monetary incentives and assumed that the agents are
only driven by their private bene…ts. This assumption can be motivated on
the ground that monetary contingent payments are not observed in practice,
at least not in the applications discussed above. Indeed, judges and antitrust
regulators are usually given job life positions and …xed salaries in order to
preserve their independence. We have also abstracted from moral hazard
consideration, by taking the agents’ e¤ort to search for information as given.
We believe that extending our analysis in this direction, by taking a more
internal organization view point, would be an interesting topic for future
research.
10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that H < H1 implies that condition (9)
does not hold. Hence, the equilibrium strategies of the appeal game under
Discretion-Partisanship are given by (10) and (11) and expression (12) yields








Thus, Discretion-Partisanship dominates Discretion-Investigatorship if the
expression above is lower than (6). Trivial calculations prove the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that a punishment P is imposed
to a party that is caught manipulating her information and let ¯(P ) · 1
denote the associated probability of manipulation, with ¯0(P ) < 0. Then,
from (7), the expected payo¤ from appealing becomes
¯®x¹
¯®x¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)U ¡ H
For H < H(¯); where H(¯) = ¯®¹1¡¹+¯®¹U , H 0(¯) > 0 and H(1) = H0; we
have
x¤(¯) = (1 ¡ ¹)H






¯ < 0: Thus,
@¯x¤(¯)
@¯ = 0. In equilibrium more manip-
ulation by party i = a; b requires less cheating from the decision maker.
Speci…cally, ¯x¤(¯) = costant; as a consequence of the Parties knowing
their preferences. Now consider the e¤ect of ¯ on y¤; y¤ solves
¡y ¹¯
¯¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)R + y
(1 ¡ ¹)
¯¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)V + (1 ¡ y)V = 0
For R > R(¯); where R(¯) = 1¡¹¹¯ V , R0(¯) < 0 and R(1) = R0; we have





@¯ = ¡ (1¡¹)V¹¯2(V+R) < 0:
When H(¯) < H < H0 or R0 < R < R(¯); the proof is trivial. So, we
restrict attention to H < H(¯) and R > R(¯). In this case, the expected
loss for the principal under Discretion-Partisanship is given by
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Thus, a necessary and su¢cient condition for @L
DP










The intuition as to why condition (19) is always true can be understood
as follows. The expected ex ante pay-o¤ of the decision maker can be written
as
(1 ¡ ¹)2x¤(¯)V + ¹¯x¤(¯)[V ¡ y¤(¯)(V + R)] (20)
Since d¯x
¤(¯)
d¯ = 0, an increase in ¯ a¤ects expressions (20) and (18) only
through its e¤ect on x¤and y¤. Moreover, in equilibrium expression (20)
must equal zero for any ¯. This implies expression (19).
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that the investigator conceals
information with probability ° 2 [0; °]: The expected payo¤ for party a
when she incurs H is
®x°¹ (2 ¡ ¹)
°¹ (2 ¡ ¹) + (1 ¡ ¹)2U ¡ H
and zero otherwise. For H < H(°); where H(°) = °¹(2¡¹)°¹(2¡¹)+(1¡¹)2®U with
H 0(°) > 0; this yields






The incongruent decision maker enjoys an expected payo¤ of
¡ °¹ (2 ¡ ¹)
°¹ (2 ¡ ¹) + (1 ¡ ¹)2 yR +
(1 ¡ ¹)2
°¹ (2 ¡ ¹) + (1 ¡ ¹)2yV + (1 ¡ y)V
when d 6= µ; 0 and zero otherwise. For R > R(°); where R(°) = (1¡¹)2°¹(2¡¹)V
with R0(°) < 0 and R(°) = R0, this yields






Let R > R0; then for any °; we have
LDI(°) =
8<: (1 ¡ ¹)
2®bx(°)±l + °¹(2 ¡ ¹)®bx(°) [±l ¡ by(°)(±l ¡ C)]
(1 ¡ ¹)2®±l
if H < H(°)
otherwise






if H · H(b°)
otherwise
Tedious calculations show that














if ¹ > 12we have an interior solution with b° < ° and







At H < H1; LDP is given by expression (15). The result then follows by
noting that Proposition 2 ensures that (1 ¡ ¹)2®±l > LDP ; for ¹ > 12 ;
H · H(b°) implies LDI(b°) > LDP and for ¹ · 12 ; H · H(°) implies
LDI(°) > LDP .
Proof of Corollary 1. Immediate by the proof of Proposition 5,
where b° may be lower than °.
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